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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Tiffany Dee Razon appeals from the district court's orders revoking 
probation following periods of probation in two separate criminal cases. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
In 2006, Razon was charged in Twin Falls County District Court case CR-
06-227 4 with possession of methamphetamine and/or amphetamine with intent 
to deliver and forgery. (R., pp.61-63.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Razon 
pied guilty to an amended charge of possession of methamphetamine and/or 
amphetamine and the state dismissed the forgery charge. (R., p.124.) The 
district court sentenced Razon to an underlying unified six-year term with two 
years fixed, and placed on in the retained jurisdiction ("rider") program. (R., 
pp.147-152.) After completion of her rider, the district court placed Razon on 
probation for three years. (R., pp.163-167, 174-178.) In December of 2007, the 
district court ordered Razon to serve up to 30 days of jail for admittedly using 
methamphetamine several times. (R., p.187.) In February of 2009, the state 
alleged Razon violated her probation by (1) failing to report to her probation 
officer, (2) absconding from supervision, (3) being discharged from counseling, 
(4) failing to report for substance abuse testing, (5) changing residences without 
her probation officer's permission, (6) failing to complete community service 
hours, (7) failing to wear an ankle monitor, and (8) possessing or consuming a 
controlled substance. (R., pp.189-197.) Prior to adjudication on the probation 
violation allegations, the state charged Razon with possession of 
1 
methamphetamine in a separate case (CR 09-1765), which became the basis of 
two additional probation violation allegations in her first case. (R., pp.216-217, 
393-395.) 
On April 20, 2009, Razon entered a guilty plea to possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine) in the second case (CR 09-1765), and 
the two cases were ordered consolidated for future hearings before Judge 
Bevan. (R., pp.400-411.) The next day, Razon admitted the first eight probation 
violation allegations in her first case, and the state dismissed the two additional 
allegations. (R., p.230.) The district court ordered Razon to be placed in the 
rider program a second time. (R., pp.224-230.) In regard to Razon's second 
case, the court sentenced her to six years with three years fixed, and also 
ordered her to complete the rider program, concurrent with her first case. (R., 
pp.413-426.) At the end of Razon's concurrent riders, the district court 
suspended her sentences and placed her on probation for three years 
(concurrent) in each case. (R., pp.233-238, 430-435, 444-449.) 
In June of 2011, the state filed two sets of probation violation allegations 
against Razon in both cases. (R., pp.244-250, 289-291, 452-458, 492-496.) 
One month later, Razon admitted violating her probations by (1) using 
methamphetamine between April 9, 2011 and May 31, 2011,1 (2) being 
discharged from substance abuse treatment, and (3) using methamphetamine on 
1 Relative to this probation violation allegation, the record reflects that Razon 
pied guilty on October 17, 2011, to felony possession of a controlled substance -
her third such conviction - and that she waived an appeal in that case because 
"the court followed the state's recommendation identically" by sentencing her to 
seven years with three years fixed, concurrent with the other two cases. 
(12/19/11 Tr., p.4, L.10 - p.5, L.8; p.23, Ls.12-19.) 
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June 19, 2011. (R., pp.319, 524.) The state dismissed the remaining probation 
violation allegations. (Id.) On December 19, 2011, the district court ordered the 
probation in each case revoked and "reimposed" the original sentences without 
modification. (R., pp.329-333, 535-539.) Razon timely appealed from the 
revocation of probation in both cases (R., pp.336-351, 542-544), which appeals 
have been consolidated by order of this Court (R., pp.350-351, 555-556). 
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ISSUES 
Razon states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Ms. Razon due process 
and equal protection when it denied her Motion to Augment 
with the requested transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to sua 
sponte reduce the length of Ms. Razon's sentences upon 
revoking probation? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Razon failed to establish the Idaho Supreme Court violated her due 
process and equal protection rights by denying her motion to augment the 
appellate record with irrelevant transcripts? 
2. Has Razon failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by not, 
reducing her sentences sua sponte? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Razon Has Failed To Establish The Idaho Supreme Court Violated Her Due 
Process And Equal Protection Rights By Denying Her Motion To Augment The 
Appellate Record With Irrelevant Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
After the appellate record was settled, Razon filed a motion to augment 
the record with seven as-yet unprepared transcripts consisting of two rider review 
hearings, two entry of plea hearings, the sentencing hearing, one evidentiary 
hearing, and one admit/deny hearing. ("Motion To Augment And To Suspend 
The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof." filed June 25, 2012 
(hereinafter "Motion").) After the state filed an objection in part to the Motion 
(6/26/12 "Objection In Part To 'Motion to Augment [etc.]'"), the Idaho Supreme 
Court denied Razon's Motion to augment the record with regard to all but one of 
her requests. ("Order," filed 7/11/12.) 
Razon now contends that, by denying her motion to augment the appellate 
record with the remaining requested transcripts, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
violated her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and has 
effectively denied her effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.5-17.) Razon has failed to establish a violation of her constitutional 
rights, however, because she has failed to show that the requested transcripts 
are even relevant to, much less necessary for resolution of, the only issues over 
which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
C. Razon Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement To The 
Requested Augmentation 
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to "a record on appeal that is 
sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the 
proceedings below." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477 
(2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 
U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms and Paroles, 
357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). The state, however, 
"will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide transcripts or 
other items that "will not be germane to consideration of the appeal." Draper, 
372 U.S. at 495; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 112 n.5 (1996) ("an 
indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the trial record that are 
germane to consideration of the appeal" (internal citations omitted)); Lane, 372 
U.S. 477; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12. To demonstrate that the record is not su'fficient, 
the defendant must show that any omissions from the record prejudiced her 
ability to pursue the appeal. State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 P.2d 
229, 234-35 (1968) (distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 148, 438 P.2d 893 
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(1968)). See also United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93 (1 st Cir. 2002). To 
show prejudice, Razon "must present something more than gross speculation 
that the transcripts were requisite to a fair appeal." Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 
605 (6th Cir. 2002). Razon has failed to carry this burden. 
Razon's appeal is timely only from the district court's December 19, 2011 
orders revoking probation. (See R., pp.330-333, 336-338, 536-539, 542-544.) 
Because Razon's appeal is timely only from the district court's orders revoking 
probation and ordering her underlying sentences executed, those are the only 
issues over which the appellate court has jurisdiction. See,~. State v. Payan, 
128 Idaho 866, 867, 920 P.2d 82, 83 (Ct. App. 1996) (a timely filed notice of 
appeal is a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction); State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891, 
665 P.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1983) (same). Nevertheless, Razon sought to augment 
the appellate record with the following transcripts: ( 1) Transcript of the entry of 
plea hearing held on July 24, 2006; (2) Transcript of the sentencing hearing held 
on September 18, 2006; (3) Transcript of the rider review hearing held on March 
7, 2007; (4) Transcript of the evidentiary hearing held on April 21, 2009; (5) 
Transcript of the rider review hearing held on October 14, 2009; (6) Transcript of 
the admit/deny probation violation hearing held on July 26, 2011; and (7) 
Transcript of the entry of plea hearing held on April 20, 2009. (Motion, pp.1-2.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court granted Razon's request to augment the appellate 
record with the sixth requested item (transcript of the 7/26/11 admit/deny 
probation violation hearing), and denied Razon's remaining augmentation 
requests. {Order, 7-11-12.) 
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On appeal, Razon argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied her due 
process and equal protection by denying her motion to augment the appellate 
record with the remaining as-yet unprepared transcripts (i.e., items 1 through 5, 
7). However, she has failed to adequately explain, much less demonstrate, how 
the requested transcripts of hearings relate to the only issues on appeal - the 
district court's orders revoking probation and ordering her underlying sentences 
executed. 
Razon contends "the requested transcripts are relevant to the issue of 
whether the district court abused its sentencing discretion." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.5.) Despite Razon's argument, because the as-yet unprepared transcripts 
were never presented to the district court in relation to the consolidated probation 
revocation hearing at issue in this case, they were never part of the record before 
the district court and are not properly considered for the first time on appeal. See 
State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(in rendering a decision on the issues raised on appeal, the appellate court is 
"limited to review of the record made below" and "will not consider new evidence 
that was never before the trial court"); see also Huerta v. Huerta, 127 Idaho 77, 
80, 896 P .2d 985, 988 (Ct. App. 1995) ("It is not the role of this Court to entertain 
new allegations of fact and consider new evidence."). 
Razon responds that the requested transcripts are relevant because the 
district court was entitled to "rely upon the information it already knows from 
presiding over the prior hearings when it made its sentencing determinations." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12.) However, Razon does not explain where the record 
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gives any indication that the court in fact relied on its memory of specific aspects 
of those proceedings in revoking her probations and ordering her sentences 
executed. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.5-15.) Nor does Razon adequately explain 
how transcripts of the prior hearings, held between two and five years previously, 
are necessary to decide the only issues over which this Court has jurisdiction on 
this appeal. Indeed, there is no evidence that the district court had the as-yet 
unprepared transcripts when it revoked Razon's probation in December 2011, or 
that it relied upon anything said at the prior hearings as a basis for its decision to 
finally revoke Razon's probation and order her sentences executed. Razon's 
suggestion that the district court may have relied on its own recollection of the 
prior proceedings in deciding whether to revoke her probation (Appellant's Brief, 
p.12 ("the court may rely upon the information it already knows .... ") is pure 
speculation and fails to show that the requested transcripts are necessary to 
complete a record adequate for appellate review under the facts of this case. 
Razon further contends, citing State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 
P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009), that "[t]he requested transcripts are relevant because 
Idaho appellate courts review all proceedings following sentencing when 
determining whether the court made appropriate sentencing determinations." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.13.) The state recognizes the Idaho Court of Appeals' 
statement in Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 8, that appellate "review 
[of] a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation" is 
based "upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events 
occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." 
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Contrary to Razon's assertions, however, Hanington does not stand for the 
proposition that a merits-based review of a decision to revoke probation and 
order a sentence executed requires preparation and inclusion in the appellate 
record of transcripts of every hearing over which the trial court presided. To the 
contrary, the law is well established that, absent a showing that evidence was 
presented at prior hearings and that the district court relied on such evidence in 
reaching its decision to revoke probation, an appellant is not entitled to 
transcription at public expense of every hearing conducted before the date 
probation was finally revoked. 2 Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 
(1971) (state is not "required to expend its funds unnecessarily" where "part or all 
of the stenographic transcript ... will not be germane to consideration of the 
appeal" (citation and internal quotations omitted)); Draper, 372 U.S. at 496 
("[T]he fact that an appellant with funds may choose to waste his money by 
unnecessarily including in the record all of the transcripts does not mean that the 
2 In the recently decided (non-final, yet to be released for publication) decision 
by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Morgan, --- P.3d ----, 2012 WL 2782599 
*3 (Idaho App. 2012), relied upon here as instructive, the Court explained: 
Morgan asserts that this Court's decision in State v. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 218 P.3d 5 (Ct. App. 2009), requires a 
review of the entire record of proceedings in the trial court up to and 
including the revocation of probation. Morgan reads Hanington too 
broadly. As stated in Hanington, in reviewing the propriety of a 
probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily confine ourselves to only 
those facts which arise after sentencing to the time of the 
revocation of probation. Id. at 28, 218 P.3d at 8. However, that 
does not mean that all proceedings in the trial court up to and 
including sentencing are germane. The focus of the inquiry is the 
conduct underlying the trial court's decision to revoke probation. 
Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the 
trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are 
properly made part of the record on appeal. 
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State must waste its funds by providing what is unnecessary for adequate 
appellate review."). 
Although there may be some circumstances that require inclusion in the 
appellate record of transcripts of sentencing, rider review, and probation violation 
hearings to fully review a probation revocation hearing, Razon has failed to show 
that any such circumstances apply here. There is nothing provided by Razon 
that would indicate that what happened at the prior hearings, held between two 
and five years before the issuance of the decision that is at issue on appeal, was 
considered or played any role in the district court's decision to revoke Razon's 
probations and order her sentences executed. Accordingly, Razon has failed to 
show such transcripts are necessary to complete an adequate record on this 
appeal. 
Citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971 ), Razon claims she is 
only required to make a "colorable argument" that she "needs items to create a 
complete a record on appeal" before the burden transfers to the state "to prove 
that the· requested items are not necessary for the appeal." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.10.) She also argues, with no citation whatsoever, that "to meet the 
constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection," the state must 
provide him (and all indigent defendants) "with an appellate record unless the 
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.7; see also p.5 ("[T]he only way a court can constitutionally preclude an 
indigent defendant from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the 
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transcript is irrelevant to the issues raised on appeal.").) No reading of Mayer 
supports these legal arguments. 
Mayer was convicted on non-felony charges punishable only by a fine and 
he appealed, challenging the sufficiency of evidence and asserting a claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct. kl at 190. The appellate court denied his request for 
a trial transcript at government expense on the basis of a local rule providing that 
verbatim transcripts of trial proceedings would be provided at government 
expense only for felonies. kl at 191-193. The issue was not whether Mayer was 
entitled to a record of his trial, but whether he was entitled to a verbatim 
transcript of his trial. kl at 193. The Court noted it had addressed a similar 
issue in Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), where the Court held that 
the government need not provide transcripts that were not '"germane to 
consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds 
unnecessarily in such circumstances."' Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194 (quoting Draper, 
372 U.S. at 495-96). However, "the State must provide a full verbatim record 
where that is necessary to assure the indigent as effective an appeal as would be 
available to the defendant with resources to pay his own way." kl at 195. 
"Moreover, where the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable 
need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a 
portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on 
those grounds." kl 
Thus, if it is not clear on the existing record, an indigent appellant must 
establish that a record of certain "proceedings" is germane to the appeal. kl at 
12 
194. Only after the germaneness of the requested record of the proceedings is 
established and a colorable need for a verbatim record is shown by the appellant 
will the burden shift to the state to demonstrate that a partial transcript or some 
record other than a verbatim transcript will be adequate. lsL_ at 194-95. See also 
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227-28 (1971) (in deciding whether 
requested record necessary court should consider the "value of the transcript to 
the defendant in connection with the appeal," but standard does not require "a 
showing of need tailored to the facts of the particular case" and the court may 
take notice of the importance of a transcript). 
Here the only proceeding challengeable on appeal is Razon's 
consolidated probation violation hearing. The record related to the district court's 
decision is already complete because all of the evidence considered by the 
district court for that hearing is before the appellate court. It is Razon's appellate 
burden to establish that the requested transcripts are necessary to create an 
adequate appellate record to review the orders revoking her probations and 
executing her sentences. The augmentation she sought, however, was of never 
before prepared transcripts of hearings held two to five years before the district 
court rendered the decisions at issue in this case. Nothing in the record even 
suggests that the requested transcripts (or anything contained therein) were 
before the district court in relation to probation violation hearing. Because Razon 
failed to make a showing of germaneness and colorable need for the requested 
transcripts, there is no burden on the state. Because all of the evidence before 
the district court is in the appellate record, that record is adequate for appellate 
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review, and Razon has failed to establish a violation of her due process rights. 3 
Strand, 137 Idaho at 463, 50 P.3d at 478. 
Razon has also failed to establish that denial of her request to augment 
the record on appeal with irrelevant transcripts denied her equal protection. 
Razon cites to several cases where criminal defendants were denied appellate 
records because of their indigence. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.7-11 (citing, ~. 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); 
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963)).) However, there is nothing in the record 
that in any way indicates that the Idaho Supreme Court denied Razon's request 
for transcripts solely because she is indigent. In fact, Razon's motion would have 
properly been denied even if she had the funds to pay for the transcripts. The 
Idaho Appellate Rules require any party seeking augmentation to set forth a 
ground sufficient to justify the augmentation requested. I.A.R. 30. Razon's 
motion to augment failed because she failed to meet this minimal burden, 
imposed upon all parties, of showing that the transcripts were necessary or even 
helpful in addressing appellate issues. The Idaho Supreme Court's order 
properly denied the motion to augment because Razon failed to make a showing 
that any appellant - indigent or otherwise - would be entitled to augment the 
record as requested. There is no reason to believe that the motion to augment 
3 As a component of his due process claim, Razon argues that the denial of her 
motion to augment the record with the requested transcripts has deprived her of 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-17.) 
Because Razon has failed to show that the requested transcripts are necessary, 
or even relevant, for appellate review of the district court's orders revoking her 
probations and executing her sentences, there is no possibility that the denial of 
the motion to augment has deprived Razon of effective assistance of counsel on 
this appeal. 
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would have been granted had Razon been paying for the requested transcripts; 
the rule applies to all parties, not just the indigent. 
Razon has failed to show that the denial of her motion to augment was in 
any way influenced or decided by her indigence, nor has she demonstrated that 
the requested transcripts are necessary to complete a record adequate to review 
any issue over which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal. To the contrary, the 
record amply demonstrates that Razon's motion to augment with the requested 
transcripts was properly denied because she failed to show that the transcripts 
were necessary for adequate review of the district court's orders revoking her 
probations and executing her sentences. Because Razon has failed to show her 
due process and equal protection rights were implicated, much less violated, by 
the denial of her motion to augment, she has failed to show any basis for relief. 
11. 
Razon Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It 
Failed, Sua Sponte, To Reduce Her Sentences Pursuant To Rule 35 
A Introduction 
Razon asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it failed, 
sua sponte, to reduce her sentences pursuant to Rule 35 upon revoking 
probation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.17-20.) The record, however, supports the 
district court's decision to revoke probation and order the underlying sentences of 
six years with two years fixed in her 2006 case, and six years with three years 
fixed in her 2009 case, executed without reduction. 
15 
B. Standard Of Review 
Upon revoking Razon's probations, the district court had the authority, 
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35, to sua sponte reduce the underlying 
sentences imposed upon her convictions for possession of a controlled 
substance. I.C.R. 35; State v. McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397, 400, 179 P.3d 360, 363 
(Ct. App. 2008). The decision of whether to do so was committed to the district 
court's discretion and, as such, Razon bears the burden on appeal of 
establishing that the district court abused its discretion by not sua sponte 
reducing her sentences. lg.,_ 
C. Razon Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
When It Failed, Sua Sponte, To Reduce Her Sentences Pursuant To Rule 
35 
Razon asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it failed, 
sua sponte, to reduce her sentences pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 because 
of numerous mitigating factors, including her progress toward completed her 
GED, family support, difficult childhood, her mental health, methamphetamine 
addiction, and her positive performances in the rider program. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.17-20.) Razon has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
From the outset of Razon's first case (CR 06-2274), she engaged in a 
pattern of non-compliance with court and probationary orders that permeates her 
two cases. As a special condition of being initially released on bond, she was 
ordered to abide by the requirements of the Court Compliance Program, but 
failed to appear at her required scheduled appointments with the Court 
Compliance Office, resulting in the court ordering her back into custody. (R., 
16 
pp.64-68, 94-99.) Following her first rider, Razon violated the conditions of her 
probation by: (1) failing to report to her probation officer, (2) absconding from 
supervision, (3) being discharged from counseling, (4) failing to report for 
substance abuse testing, (5) changing residences without her probation officer's 
permission, (6) failing to complete community service hours, (7) failing to wear an 
ankle monitor, and (8) possessing or consuming a controlled substance. (R., 
pp.189-197.) In 2009, and while still on probation in her first case, Razon pied 
guilty to a second charge of felony possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine). (R., pp.216-217, 393-395, 400-410.) In the probation 
violation disposition in Razon's first case, and as her initial sentence in her 
second case, the court gave her the opportunity to complete a second rider, 
which resulted in her being placed on probation a second time. (R., pp.233-238, 
430-435, 444-449.) Razon not only violated the conditions of that second 
probation, she did so by committing another felony offense of possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine). (R., pp.319, 524; 12/19/11 Tr., p.4, 
L.10 - p.5, L.8; p.23, Ls.12-19; see fn. 1, supra.) In short, Razon was given the 
opportunity, following two riders, to succeed on probation, and completely failed 
to do so. 
The district court acknowledged Razon's strong family support, mental 
health issues, and ongoing treatment possibilities, but reluctantly concluded that 
it had done all it could to allow Razon the opportunity to show she could be 
rehabilitated while on probation, explaining: 
We've been down this road five years now and tried two riders 
worth of rehab. We've tried community settings. . . . We tried 
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community support, family support groups, and ACTS program, A-
C-T-S program. And I think the frustration that the court sees ... is 
that no matter what we try to do to encourage, with somewhat of a 
hammer over your head, your return to sobriety and this good life 
that you have a potential for, nothing seems to work in the 
community. Nothing seems to be enough of a threat, if you will, to 
deal with the throes of the addiction, which in your case is obviously 
extreme and one that has led you to this point. You've had some 
difficulties in your past. I acknowledge those things that have led 
you here . 
. . . Let me quote the words from the discharge summary at 
Positive Connections back in June of his year: The use of any 
substance may exacerbate Tiffany's mental health symptoms or 
status. It's recommended she attend residential treatment in a 
controlled environment. Perhaps treatment in a controlled 
environment will help this client cease her use of illicit drugs. 
That report is telling in the fact that it talks about your coming 
to one group in an IOP program under the influence of meth back in 
May of this year and then ongoing difficulties to the point that you 
were discharged there. 
I recognize that TARC has some options for you, and Jubilee 
House offered you a place to stay; but it just seems like we're 
opening the same door with the same result, time after time, in your 
case, Ma'am. 
(12/19/11 Tr., p.19, L9-p.21, L.4.) 
In summarizing its decision to impose Razon's original sentences, the 
court explained, "I don't do that simply to punish you. I think, though, there is a 
component of that, that the good order of society, certainly after this much time 
and this many tries, has to say, you know, enough is enough, and we have to 
pay the fiddler for what we've done wrong over his five-year period of ongoing 
criminality." (12/19/11 Tr., p.22, Ls.3-9.) Finally, the district court acknowledged 
it had authority under Rule 35 to reduce the sentences, but declined to do so in 
its discretion. (12/19/11 Tr., p.22, L.24 - p.23, L.1.) 
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The district court's decision not to further reduce Razon's sentences upon 
revoking her probations was appropriate in light of her continuous failure to abide 
by the terms and conditions of probation. In review of the entire record, the 
district court's decision to revoke Razon's probations was reasonable in light of 
the nature of her underlying offenses, her criminal history, and an unwillingness 
to abide by the conditions of probation. Considering all those factors, Razon was 
not entitled to have the district court sua sponte reduce her sentences. Given 
any reasonable view of the facts, Razon has failed to establish an abuse of 
sentencing discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
orders revoking probation and executing her original sentences. 
DATED this 30th day of November, 2012. 
C. McKINNEY 
ty Attorney Genera 
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